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Abstract 
We use unique survey data from Bulgaria’s currency board to examine the reasons for persistent 
incomplete credibility of a financial stabilization regime. Although it produced remarkably 
positive effects in terms of sustained low inflation since 1997, the currency board has not 
achieved full credibility. This is not uncommon in other less-developed countries with fixed 
exchange rate regimes. Our results reveal that incomplete credibility is explained primarily by 
concerns about external economic shocks and the persistent high unemployment in the country. 
Past experiences with high inflation do not rank among the top reasons to expect financial 
instability in the future.  
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Beliefs about Exchange-Rate Stability: Survey Evidence  
from the Currency Board in Bulgaria 
 
I.   Introduction. 
Fixed exchange rate regimes often fail to achieve full credibility even after years of 
financial stability. If a country has a national currency in circulation, it has the option to devalue 
at some point in the future. Aware of that possibility, investors demand a premium on assets in 
local currency, which raises the cost of capital and leads to lower investment and lower 
economic growth, which may in turn contribute to the collapse of the fixed exchange rate 
regime. As Dornbusch (2001) points out, “it is sometimes argued that a stabilization failed 
because it was not credible.” A number of factors may contribute to incomplete credibility. 
Financial instability may be a chronic problem and it may take a long time to convince agents 
that the current effort will be sustained. Negative economic shocks may generate new concerns. 
There could be doubts about the intentions of potential policymakers around election times. 
Although these and other factors are often brought up to explain incomplete credibility, direct 
evidence is difficult to obtain. This paper presents such evidence using unique survey data from 
Bulgaria.  
Bulgaria introduced a currency board in 1997 after a severe financial crisis. Along with 
other reforms, the currency board contributed to a remarkable economic recovery and to 
restoring some confidence in the local currency, which had plummeted during the crisis. Yet, 
confidence in the local currency remains incomplete. Data from the Bulgarian National Bank 
(various years) show that about 60 percent of deposits in the banking system are in foreign 
currencies. During the 2000 to 2003 period, the average spread between interest rates on one-
year local-currency bank deposits and euro deposits was 284 basis points.
1 Consistent with the 
currency risk premium on bank deposits, a sequence of four national surveys from 2000 to 2003 
show that a non-negligible part of the population persistently believed that the currency board 
                                                 
1 This situation is not unique to Bulgaria. According to Schmukler and Serven (2002), the spread between interest 
rates on peso and dollar bank deposits in Argentina, another country with a currency board until recently, averaged 
211 basis points from 1993 to 2001. In June 2000, 63.3 percent of bank deposits in Argentina were in foreign 
currency, similar to previous years. In 2002 in Estonia, after ten years under a currency board system, the spread 
between 1 year time deposits in local currency and euro was 69 basis points. In Lithuania, another country with a 
currency board, the spread between 1 year local currency and dollar deposits was 115 basis points. Lithuania fixed 
its currency to the dollar in 1994.    2
would collapse with a sharp devaluation in the near future. Only about a fifth of the respondents 
believed that the likelihood of devaluation was zero. These percentages were fairly stable over 
time with no apparent trend of growth in confidence in the currency board after 2000.
  
There are a number of results in the paper, which identify various reasons for these 
expectations. In general terms, the surveys show that incomplete credibility is explained 
primarily by concerns about external economic shocks and by the perception that austerity under 
the currency board contributes to high unemployment. Past experiences with high inflation in 
Bulgaria did not rank among the top reasons to expect financial instability in the future. As we 
argue later in the paper, the weak effect of past instability on expectations is explained by the 
ongoing market reforms during that period. Overall, expectations of devaluation are evidently 
driven primarily by forward-looking considerations regarding economic growth and the ability 
of the economy to withstand external influences.  
The results presented here complement earlier literature, which has used interest rate 
spreads and forward exchange rate contracts to study credibility. Rose and Svensson (1995), and 
Bekaert and Gray (1998) analyze the credibility of exchange rate target zones in the European 
Monetary System. Related to the analysis here are studies on currency board credibility in 
Argentina, Hong Kong, and Bulgaria by Schmukler and Serven (1992), Rzepkowski (2003), 
Carlson and Valev (2001), and Slavova (2003).  
There are several advantages to using survey data. First, survey data can reveal concerns 
that cannot be detected using available financial data. Schmukler and Serven (2002) explain 
expected devaluation in Argentina by various economic and political shocks. They also find, 
however, that confidence in the peso remained incomplete even in periods of “tranquility”. The 
same is observed in Bulgaria. The survey data show that, as in Obstfeld (1997), expectations are 
affected by the possibility for future shocks even if shocks do not occur.  
Second, the surveys allow us to test the effect of beliefs about the monetary regime on 
expectations. In Bulgaria, about a third of the population was aware that the currency board 
eliminates monetary discretion, prevents the central bank from making loans to the government, 
and requires large exchange rate reserves. Interestingly, agents who were familiar with those 
restrictions had lower confidence in the long-term sustainability of the currency board. The 
surveys also show that a third of the population believed that the currency board contributed to 
high unemployment in the country. These views were associated with lower credibility.    3
A third advantage of survey data in that context is that they reveal short-term and long-
term credibility. When credibility is low, financial assets have short-term maturity, so interest 
rates or forward contracts cannot be used to measure longer-term expectations. This is the case in 
Bulgaria. The surveys ask about expected devaluation over a 6 month, 1 year, and a 5 years 
horizon. The results show lower credibility over longer horizons. Finally, the demographic data 
of the surveys make it possible to study heterogeneity in expectations in the population.   
Household survey data on expectations have been used extensively in the literature. 
Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) and Carroll (2003) are recent examples of analyses using the 
University of Michigan data on consumer inflation forecasts. Batchelor and Orr (1991) use UK 
consumer expectations data and Jonung and Laidler (1988) use Swedish survey data. Frankel and 
Flood (1987) and Kaminsky (1993) among others have used survey data on experts’ expectations 
of the exchange rates of major currencies. The Bulgarian data used here are unique because the 
surveys target directly the question of credibility. The surveys ask respondents why they hold 
certain expectations after asking them to make a forecast. The next section provides a brief 
background on relevant economic developments in Bulgaria. We then present the survey data 
and empirical results in sections III through VI. Section VII concludes with final remarks.   
 
II.   Financial stabilization under the Bulgarian currency board. 
According to Schwartz (1993) and Williamson (1995), a currency board is a fixed 
exchange rate regime similar to a gold standard regime. The authorities forego discretionary 
control over the money supply and replace it with an automatic mechanism that links money 
supply changes to the balance of payments. The amount of foreign exchange reserves that the 
currency board stands ready to exchange for domestic money is sufficient to cover the monetary 
base.
 The currency board has no responsibilities to react to unemployment or to finance the 
budget.
2 In Bulgaria these operating rules are written into the Law of the Bulgarian National 
Bank. The legal framework makes it difficult to change the rules of the monetary regime and 
also serves as an important “information device” (Ho, 2002) since the objectives and tools of 
                                                 
2 See Miller (2002), Gulde (1999), and Nenovsky and Hristov (2002) for analyses of the Bulgarian currency board 
and Desquilbet and Nenovsky (2004) for differences between currency boards and gold standard regimes with 
respect to credibility. Desquilbet and Nenovsky (2004) argue that currency boards are often implemented as a 
stabilization tool after financial crises and can achieve credibility less successfully than gold standard regimes,   4
monetary operations are spelled out in black and white. Although the law can be changed, it 
deters ad hoc changes in policy. The legal framework is an important difference between 
currency boards and standard fixed exchange rate regimes.  
The design of the Bulgarian currency board is not completely orthodox as described 
above. The central bank, which was preserved as an institution, can provide liquidity to the 
banking system and its balance sheet contains a large deposit by the government. Each of these 
features can lead to changes in money supply irrespective of changes in the level of foreign 
exchange reserves. Hanke (2002), Hanke and Sekerke (2003), and Nenovsky and Hristov (2002) 
show that, although they have generally not been deliberate efforts to conduct monetary policy, 
such changes have occurred over the last six years. This is not uncommon of currency boards or 
historical gold standard regimes as Desquilbet and Nenovsky (2004) point out. Nevertheless, one 
wonders whether confidence in the currency board is reduced because of its deviations from 
orthodoxy. We discuss this further later in the paper.  
 
The currency board was introduced on July 1
st 1997 after a financial crisis in late 1996 
and early 1997. During the crisis, the exchange rate depreciated more than 25 times, many banks 
failed, and prices increased at a hyperinflation rate. The collapse of the currency and the banking 
system wiped out the savings of a large part of the population. The currency board faced the task 
of restoring confidence in the local currency from near zero levels as almost the entire economy 
was dollarized. At the core of the crisis was a slow process in market reform. For several years 
since the beginning of transition in 1990, loss-making state firms operated on soft budget 
constraints and managed to accumulate large debts to banks which were in turn implicitly 
guaranteed by the state. Restructuring and privatization were advancing at a very slow pace as 
Dobrinsky (2000) describes. By 1996, it started to become clear that the government lacked the 
resources to back the credit guarantees, and bank deposits began to leave the financial system. 
The process accelerated and by the end of 1996, the currency was depreciating rapidly, the 
central bank was extending large credits to keep banks afloat, and price increases escalated into 
hyperinflation in the first months of 1997.      
                                                                                                                                                             
which, as they argue, have historically originated endogenously to facilitate exchange.    5
The introduction of the currency board was part of an overall effort to restructure the 
economy. The government which came to power in 1997 cut subsidies, closed down large 
numbers of loss-making state firms, and accelerated privatization. In 1998 alone, it privatized as 
many state firms as were privatized since the beginning of transition. The government also 
tightened welfare and unemployment benefits and sold off many banks. As a result, the private 
sector share of Bulgaria’s GDP increased from 45 percent in 1996 to around 75 percent in 2002, 
which put Bulgaria in line with the private sector shares in advanced transition economies 
(EBRD, 2003). The currency board provided an incentive for those efforts because it prevented 
the use of money creation for debt financing. The government had to introduce harder budget 
constraints to ensure fiscal sustainability. The low inflation delivered by the currency board was 
also important in facilitating credit expansion in the economy and in encouraging investment.  
Inflation and other statistics about the performance of the Bulgarian economy are presented in 
Table 1. 
With the introduction of the currency board, inflation declined and has remained low and 
output growth has increased. The hyperinflation in 1997 also helped reduce the domestic debt of 
the government. Interest payments on domestic debt declined from 17 percent of GDP in 1996 to 
1.2 percent of GDP in 1998. Privatization generated revenues and contributed to growing foreign 
exchange reserves as much of it was done by selling firms to foreign companies. On those 
counts, the short-term outlook for the currency board looked very positive. In fact, the currency 
board and other reforms produced a remarkable turnaround in the economy from the early years 
of ad hoc transition. Internationally, the country was praised for rapid reforms and 
macroeconomic stability. For example, the Standard & Poor’s sovereign credit rating for 
Bulgaria was raised from B in 1998 to BBB- in 2003.  
There were several reasons for longer-term concerns. First, despite positive growth, 
unemployment remained high. It increased with the reforms and peaked at 19.5 percent in 2001 
before declining in 2002 and 2003. By 2003 the unemployment rate had declined to 12.7 percent 
but remained high nonetheless. The prolonged stagnation put pressure on the government to 
engage in more activist policy. To some extent the discontent with policy was directed against 
the currency board as it was associated with restrictions on the governments’ ability to increase 
spending or to lower taxes. Many people viewed the currency board as a constraint on the 
economy imposed by international institutions, namely the IMF. Second, Bulgaria had a large   6
and growing current account deficit, and large foreign debt of about 70 percent of GDP. In 2003, 
the current account deficit was 8.7 percent of GDP. Much of the capital that financed the current 
account deficits was in the form of foreign direct investment linked to privatization. With the end 
of privatization these inflows will decline, which can put pressure on the external balances of the 
country unless other funds are forthcoming, such as pre-accession assistance from the European 
Union or green-field investment. International developments may contribute to those pressures. 
The war in neighboring Yugoslavia, which cut trade routes to Western Europe, depressed 
exports substantially. The international financial crises in Russia, neighboring Turkey, and 
elsewhere in the late 1990’s may have depressed both exports and the inflow of foreign capital. 
Bulgaria is a small and very open economy where exports equaled 53 percent of GDP in 2002 
and external shocks have potentially strong effects.  
The financial crisis that led to the introduction of the currency board was the third high 
inflation episode since transition began. The price liberalization in 1991 and the correction of an 
overvalued exchange rate in 1994 produced sharp increases in prices and the exchange rate. The 
prior episodes of high inflation are important because the surveys ask whether past inflation 
conditioned expectations of future instability. Research has used the idea that chronic instability 
creates expectations of “temporary stabilization” (Calvo, 1986). In the context of a transition 
economy, these experiences may weigh less on expectations to the extent that the root causes of 
earlier instability, i.e., slow reform, were a thing of the past. In addition, the experience has not 
been one of repeated failures of stabilization programs over several decades as in Latin America. 
Prices were stable under communism before 1990. Looking forward, Bulgaria is expected to join 
the European Union in 2007 and the European Monetary Union a few years thereafter, replacing 
the local currency with the euro. Thus, a neat exit from the currency board is foreseeable on the 
horizon. The next sections investigate the extent to which Bulgarians expect a less orderly exit 
from the currency board regime.  
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III.   Presenting the survey data. 
We use data from four national household surveys, which were conducted by a national 
polling organization in Bulgaria in August 2000, October 2001, June 2002, and August 2003. 
The sample of about 1000 respondents and its demographic structure are standard for national 
surveys taken in Bulgaria and are considered representative of the population of 8 million.
3 The 
surveys are part of a long-term project on the economic transition in Bulgaria and the level of 
confidence in its currency board. The surveys were conducted by personal interviews by certified 
professionals. The question of central interest in this paper is on confidence in the sustainability 
of the currency board. The surveys asked respondents the following question:  
Question 1: In your opinion, what is the likelihood that the currency board will collapse 
with a sharp devaluation of the local currency in the next 6 months/12 months/5 years?  
Respondents could choose an answer ranging from “very big” to “none”, i.e., zero 
probability of devaluation, or choose to say that they could not provide an answer. Next, the 
surveys inquire about respondents’ views on the effect of the currency board on economic 
activity and about their beliefs regarding currency board operations. In Question 2, the surveys 
ask whether respondents strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the 
statement that the currency board contributes to high unemployment.  We are interested in 
whether respondents who perceive a negative effect of the currency board on unemployment 
have less confidence in its sustainability. In Question 3, the surveys ask whether respondents 
strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed or strongly disagreed with each of the following three 
statements: 
Statement 1: Under the currency board, the authorities cannot issue currency at their 
discretion. 
  
Statement 2: Under the currency board, the executive branch of the government cannot 
borrow funds from the central bank. 
 
Statement 3: Under the currency board, the leva (domestic money) in circulation have full 
coverage by the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank. 
                                                 
3 The 2002 survey had fewer respondents (850) than the remaining three surveys. The survey questionnaires, the   8
The three statements are correct and describe the main features of the currency board: the 
elimination of monetary discretion, the separation of the government from the printing press, and 
the backing of local money using foreign exchange reserves, although, as we pointed out earlier, 
Statement 1 may not describe the currency board well in practice. There are two opposing 
effects, which determine the effect of such knowledge on credibility. On one hand, 
understanding the features of the monetary regime should raise credibility because the currency 
board limits the monetizing of budget deficits and ensures large reserves. On the other hand, as 
Irwin (2004) argues, a currency board may be abandoned in the presence of high and persistent 
unemployment. A policy that does not allow the government to react to negative economic 
shocks may be less sustainable than one which allows discretion. Our empirical tests later in the 
paper reveal which of the two beliefs has been stronger in Bulgaria. All surveys also ask about 
respondents’ gender, education level, age, income, and which political party they vote for.  
The 2003 survey included several additional questions on the currency board, which 
address even more directly the reasons for expected end of the currency board regime. First, the 
survey asked respondents the following question:  
Question 4: In your opinion, will Bulgaria have a currency board in the next 5 years?  
This question is broader than Question 1 on the possible collapse of the currency board; 
respondents might expect an end to the currency board without a crisis. The most likely cause of 
such a change would be entry into the European Monetary Union. The survey then inquired 
about the reasons for an end to the currency board regime if a respondent believed that the 
currency board will not be in place in 5 years:  
Question 5: In your opinion, what are the most important reasons why the currency 
board will not be in place in 5 years?  
Respondents could choose from the following list of answers: 
A1: External economic factors, which will have a negative effect on the Bulgarian 
economy. 
A2: Pressure from international institutions. 
A3: The current government intends to remove the currency board. 
                                                                                                                                                             
data, information on funding sources and on the implementation of the surveys are available from the authors.   9
A4:  The need to raise incomes in the country will make it necessary to remove the 
currency board.  
A5: Financial instability is a chronic problem in Bulgaria and the currency board cannot 
remedy that problem. 
A6: Within five years, the Bulgarian economy will be strong enough and will not need a 
currency board.  
A7: Within five years, Bulgaria will enter the European Union and the economy will use 
the euro instead of the lev.   
A8. Other. Specify. 
 
Respondents were given the opportunity to provide up to three answers. For example, a 
respondent could choose A4 in the first round, A2 in the second round, and A1 in the third 
round. The first round of answers represents the most important reasons provided by each 
respondent.
4 Answers A1 through A7 provide an opportunity to test several hypotheses. A1 
captures the importance of negative external economic shocks. Bulgaria is a small open 
economy, which is strongly affected by external events. A2 is perhaps strange at first glance as 
the IMF and the European Union have consistently supported the currency board. The answer 
was included because policies in Bulgaria often change under the directive of international 
institutions; the idea is that if a major policy shift occurs, such as removing the currency board, it 
will likely be the result of influence from international institutions. 
A3 captures uncertainty about the “type” of policymaker which is a frequent feature in 
models of monetary credibility, e.g., Backus and Driffill (1985). Expectations of devaluation 
may be higher for a respondent who does not believe that the policymaker is committed to the 
currency board. None of the major political parties in Bulgaria has advocated removing the 
currency board. Yet, political partisanship may fuel distrust of the current government, which 
                                                 
4 A small pilot survey conducted before the national survey suggested that providing possible answers was superior 
to open-ended questions. Responses to open-ended questions were sometimes vague and difficult to classify into 
groups. Nevertheless, the answers from the pilot survey guided the design of the multiple choice answers to 
Question 5 in the national survey. The answer A8 (Other; Specify) was included to capture factors that were not 
included in A1-A7. Only 5 percent of respondents chose A8 which suggests that the alternatives provided in the 
question were sufficient to capture a wide range of views on the future of the currency board.  10
was different from the one that introduced the currency board in 1997. A4 reflects the view that 
the currency board constrains economic growth by requiring fiscal and monetary austerity. The 
need to raise incomes may call for looser policies. A5 examines the role of past inflation in 
forming expectations. A6 captures the idea that the currency board is made necessary by 
weaknesses in the economy. As reforms advance and the economy develops, the need for the 
currency board will dissipate. Finally, A7 refers to replacing the currency board with entry into 
the EMU and adopting the euro as official currency.  
In the next section, we present summary statistics on expected devaluation (Questions 1), 
views on the currency board and unemployment (Question 2), and beliefs about its operations 
(Question 3) from the four surveys. Then, we use those questions along with demographics to 
study expectations in the four surveys. Following that we use Questions 4 and 5 from the 2003 
survey to provide further analysis of why many people are dubious about the viability of the 
currency board.  
 
IV.   Expected devaluation and views on the currency board: summary statistics. 
   Expected devaluation. 
A currency board is fully credible when there is little or no doubt that it will continue to 
exist. Table 2 shows respondents’ expectations of devaluation in each of the four surveys. It is 
immediately clear that the currency board is not fully credible. In 2000, a substantial fraction of 
the respondents, 31.3 percent believed that the currency board was likely or very likely to 
collapse in the next six months. This percentage was higher over longer horizons: 36.4 percent 
for 12 months and 39.0 percent for 5 years. There was a corresponding decline in certainty about 
the sustainability of the currency board over longer periods; the percent of respondents who were 
certain that the currency board would be maintained was 20.6 for 6 months, 15.3 for 12 months, 
and 12.9 for 5 years.  
In 2001, 2002, and 2003, the confidence in the currency board was somewhat higher 
compared to 2000. In those years, the percent of respondents who expected devaluation in six 
months was around 14 – 16 percent, half of the 2000 number (31.3). With a 5 year horizon, the 
percent of respondents who expected devaluation was around 27 - 30 percent, well below the 
2000 number (39 percent). The higher expected devaluation in 2000 can be explained by  11
political uncertainty preceding the 2001 elections. The movement that won the elections was 
organized only a few months before. Its economic team was put together hastily and the 
economic plan was not presented until a month before the elections. The increase in credibility in 
the 2001 survey, which was done after the elections, reflects a resolution of the uncertainty about 
the commitment of the new government to keep the currency board. An alternative explanation 
for the increase in credibility could be a gradual upward trend in confidence in the currency 
board. However, that interpretation is not supported by the steady level of expectations in 2001, 
2002, and 2003.  
There is one more intriguing result in this relatively short time series. The 2002 survey 
was done a few months after the collapse of the Argentine currency board. Expectations at that 
time, in combination with expectations from the 2001 survey before the collapse, can be used to 
observe the effects of that event on the credibility of the currency board in Bulgaria. Aside from 
an increase in the percent of respondents who could not form a forecast on the currency board 
(15.1 percent in 2002 compared to 2.6 percent in 2001), which may reflect an increase in 
uncertainty, the distribution of responses was similar. Bulgarians apparently did not draw close 
parallels between the collapse of the Argentine currency board, which was well covered in the 
media, and the sustainability of the Bulgarian currency board.  
The results from the surveys suggest that the perceived likelihood of devaluation has 
been stable for the last three years. This is consistent with the stable proportion of foreign to 
local money in savings portfolios. In light of the success of the currency board in holding down 
inflation, we may infer that long-term issues have persistent influences on credibility.  
  The currency board and high unemployment  
Table 3 shows respondents’ answers regarding the effect of the currency board on 
unemployment (Question 2). In 2000, 47.6 percent of respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed that the currency board contributed to high unemployment.  By 2003, that percent was cut 
in about half to 22.5 percent. Over time, fewer agents associated the currency board with high 
unemployment. The decline in the number of respondents who attributed high unemployment to 
the currency board was associated with an increase of the “I don’t know” answers rather than 
with an increase in the “disagree” and “strongly disagree” answers. Bulgarians are apparently 
becoming increasingly uncertain about the reasons for high unemployment in the country or at 
least about the role of the currency board in the process. Furthermore, the declining  12
unemployment rate since 2001 may contribute to a decline in opposition to the currency board 
on these grounds.   
  Beliefs about the operations of the currency board  
Table 4 reports agents’ answers on the three statements regarding currency board 
operations. A fairly large proportion of the population believed that monetary discretion is not 
possible. In 2001, for example, 54.7 percent of agents either agreed or strongly agreed that 
discretionary money creation is not possible. The percent of informed answers was somewhat 
smaller on Statements 2 and 3, which is not surprising given that these statements refer to more 
technical features of the currency board. In 2001, 36.4 percent either agreed or strongly agreed 
that the executive branch cannot borrow funds from the central bank and 45.5 percent either 
agreed or strongly agreed that the amount of foreign exchange reserves is sufficient to cover all 
local currency in circulation. Overall, judging from the answers to the three statements, the 
evidence suggests that about 35 to 55 percent of the population has knowledge of the operations 
of the currency board.
5 It also appears that the deviations from the orthodox rules discussed in 
section 2 have not influenced the perceptions regarding the Bulgarian currency board. Few 
respondents believe that the government has discretion over the money supply. The media has 
very seldom discussed the deviations of the currency board from the theoretical rules because the 
deviations have not produced detectable negative effects on the economy so far.  
Observe that the percent of “I don’t know” answers has tended to increase over time. A 
few papers have endogenized the distribution of agents into naïve or sophisticated and have 
drawn conclusions about the steady state proportion of naïve agents. In Crettez and Michel 
(1992), all agents ultimately choose not to form rational expectations. In Sethi and Franke 
(1995), the steady state is characterized by the presence of both sophisticated and naïve agents. 
The data from Bulgaria show a mix of agents as in Sethi and Franke (1995) as well as a tendency 
for declining proportion of informed agents as in Crettez and Michel (1992). The gradual loss of 
interest in the operations of the currency board may be explained by the continued financial 
stability in Bulgaria. 
 
                                                 
5 These numbers provide a benchmark estimate for numerical calibration exercises, which are based on models with 
a mix of sophisticated and naïve agents (for example, Akerlof and Yellen, 1985, Bomfim, 2001, and Carlson and 
Valev, 2002).  13
V.   Explaining cross-sectional differences in expectations. 
This section reports the estimation results of a probit model where expected devaluation 
is explained by respondents’ views on the currency board and demographic characteristics. The 
dependent variable Expected Devaluation based on Question 1 ranges from 1 to 5 where 1 stands 
for high probability of devaluation and 5 stands for a zero probability of devaluation. We ignore 
the don’t know responses.  The models are estimated using six months and five years 
expectations from the four surveys and include the explanatory variables in the following 
equation:
 6 
(1)      
i
i
u Female Age Vote Education Higher
School High Informed nt Unemployme n Devaluatio Expected
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
7 6 5 4
3 2 1
β β β β
β β β α
 
where Unemployment equals 1 if a respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that 
the currency board contributes to high unemployment, 0 otherwise. The variable Informed was 
constructed in the following way. Three dummy variables were created equal to 1 if a respondent 
agreed or strongly agreed with the three statements on currency board operations, zero 
otherwise. The three variables were then combined into a first principal component called 
Informed. Thus, a higher value of Informed reflects better understanding of the rules of the 
currency board by a respondent. High School equals 1 if a respondent had high school education, 
0 otherwise, and Higher Education equals 1 if a respondent had higher education, 0 otherwise. 
Political affiliation is measured by a dummy variable Vote which equals 1 if an agent votes for 
the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), the party that introduced the currency board in 1997. 
The hypothesis is that political affiliation with UDF was associated with greater currency-board 
credibility. Age is measured in number of years and Female equals 1 for a female respondent, 0 
for a male respondent.
7  
The results in Table 5 show that agents who believed that the currency board contributes 
to high unemployment consistently had lower confidence in its sustainability. This result holds 
                                                 
6 The ordered probit produces maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients on the right-hand side variables and 
four additional “cut-point” parameters. The estimated coefficients indicate whether a certain characteristic of 
respondents influences their perceived risk of devaluation upward or downward. These coefficients along with the 
cut-points (not reported for brevity but available on request) can be used to calculate the probability that an agent 
with particular characteristics would be in any one of the groups assigned by the values of the dependent variable. 
7 Using personal income, the number of observations decreased significantly as many respondents declined to give 
income data. As income did not come out statistically significant using the smaller sample, we opted to report 
equations which do not include income. The results using that sample are available on request.   14
for short and long-term horizons and for all surveys, except 2003 where the coefficients indicate 
the same effect but are not statistically significant at accepted significance levels. The 2001 and 
2002 surveys reveal an intriguing effect of knowledge of the rules of the currency board on 
credibility. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on Informed using a five year 
forecasting horizon indicates that the restrictive rules of the currency board lowered long-term 
credibility in those two years.   
Education also has an interesting effect. In 2000 and 2002 it has a negative effect on 
confidence in the currency board over the long-term.  This suggests that more educated agents 
may be more aware of the various risks for the currency board over the longer term. The 
negative effect of education on credibility in the 2002 survey, which was completed after the 
crash of the Argentine currency board, may also indicate heightened concerns among the more 
educated agents who were probably more familiar with international developments. By 2003, the 
differences along education lines subsided. The political affiliation variable is positive and 
statistically significant in the 2000 survey, which was done before the 2001 elections. These 
were the first parliamentary elections since the introduction of the currency board in 1997 and 
economic policy proposals had not been formulated by various parties. By the 2001 elections, 
UDF had lost political support because of its inability to fight corruption and crime, and the high 
unemployment produced by market reforms. Once it became clear that none of the major 
political parties in Bulgaria advocated removing the currency board, the effect of politics died 
out and Vote was not statistically significant in later years. Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest 
that it is primarily high unemployment that generates a persistent concern about the viability of 
the currency board. Over time, with the decline in unemployment, these concerns may gradually 
dissipate, as the non-significant effect of Unemployment on expectations in the 2003 survey 
suggest. Next, we use Questions 4 and 5 from the 2003 survey to revisit some of the effects 
reported in this section and to identify additional factors for incomplete credibility.  
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VI.   Reasons for expected end to the currency board in the 2003 survey. 
We begin this section by reporting the distribution of answers to Question 5 on the 
various reasons for removing the currency board over the next 5 years. We then use multinomial 
logit model to investigate how these beliefs are related to personal characteristics of the 
respondents. The three columns in Table 6 represent first, second, and third round of choices. 
The number of respondents who answered that the currency board would not be in place in 5 
years was 446. Almost all of these respondents (433) provided at least one justification for their 
forecast. The second and third rounds of answers had fewer respondents as some gave only one 
reason. The number one reason for removing the currency board was entry into the European 
Union. This was the answer of 27.0 percent of respondents in the first round. Of the less benign 
reasons for a perceived end to the currency board, three stand out: 1) the possibility of external 
economic shocks; 2) the need to raise incomes; and 3) pressure from international institutions. 
The second concern, i.e., the need to raise incomes in the country, supports our earlier results in 
section 5, which showed that agents who believed that the currency board contributed to high 
unemployment had lower confidence in its sustainability. Notice that chronic financial instability 
was the lowest ranked reason for expecting financial instability in the future in the first round of 
choices. However, it ranked higher in the second and third round of answers, suggesting what 
while not of utmost importance, prior instability is still a concern.  
Overall the results suggest that the backward-looking component in expectations is less 
important compared to forward-looking concerns about the economy. This may be specific to the 
context of a transition economy where the reasons for prior instability rooted in delayed reforms 
are gradually resolved. Similarly to the results reported in Table 5, concerns about the economy, 
and particularly its ability to withstand external shocks, seem to be a primary reason for concern 
about the currency board.  
Next we investigate the effect of personal characteristics on the choice of various 
answers to Question 5 by estimating a multinomial logit model where the dependent variable 
takes seven values for the seven possible answers on the first round. The marginal effects from 
this estimation are reported in Table 7. The interpretation of results is as follows. The 0.09 
coefficient on high school education in the first column means that, controlling for other 
characteristics, the probability that a respondent with high school education chooses answer A1  16
(external shocks) is 9 percentage points higher compared to a respondent without high school 
education. The coefficients in each row of the table sum to zero to reflect the fact that a 
respondent could choose only one of the alternative answers. The results in Table 7 show that 
high-school education was associated with heightened concerns about negative external 
influences on the currency board reflected in a greater likelihood of choosing A1 (external 
shocks) and A2 (pressure from international organizations). The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on Age in the first two columns of the table suggests that older agents 
share those same concerns. Because of more information for the more educated respondents or 
longer life experience for older respondents, those two groups are more likely to view Bulgaria 
as a small open economy vulnerable to external influences and shocks. Both older and more 
educated agents expressed less concern about the intentions of the current government. Notice 
also that older agents were less likely to bring up prior financial instability as a reason to expect 
future instability. A possible reason for this result is that older respondents have spent a longer 
part of their lives under financial stability during communism. Thus, life experiences over an 
extended period of time condition expectations about the success of current policies.  
 
VII.   Final remarks. 
We use survey data from Bulgaria to examine whether expectations of devaluation 
persisted after that country achieved low inflation under a currency board system and to examine 
the various influences on these expectations. The data show that expected devaluation persists 
for a non-negligible part of the population. This fits observations from financial data that show a 
relatively small but persistent spread between interest rates on domestic currency and euro bank 
deposits. Although the currency board had a very positive effect on the economy and on 
regaining confidence in the local currency after the financial crisis in 1996-97, full credibility 
remains elusive. This is not uncommon in other countries, which have used fixed exchange rates 
to reduce inflation.   
Theoretically, there are two main reasons for such persistent concerns. One is a history of 
high inflation in the past, which contributes to expectations of financial instability in the future. 
The other reason is the awareness that economic shocks may destabilize the economy and result 
in a financial crisis. Bulgarians have reasons to voice both concerns. Bulgaria is a small open  17
economy that is influenced strongly by international developments and, also, it has experienced 
high inflation since the start of transition. The surveys make it possible to weigh the relative 
importance of those concerns. The results suggest that forward-looking concerns about the 
economy are more important than the history of high inflation. This has two important 
implications. First, it explains why full confidence in a local currency is difficult to achieve. 
Complete confidence or close to compete confidence would require that the economy sustains 
rapid growth rates and that it can withstand external shocks, which is unreasonable to expect in 
an open, less-developed, economy. The second and perhaps more optimistic implication is that 
structural reforms can help increase confidence in a macroeconomic stabilization regime. 
Expected devaluation under the currency board in Bulgaria is not tied strongly to past inflation 
because the economy undergoes structural change as a result of market reforms. These reforms 
gradually eliminate the fundamental reasons for prior instability and therefore reduce concerns 
over renewed instability. In short, expectations respond to structural changes in the economic 
environment.  
The persistence of incomplete credibility does not mean that the currency board is in any 
danger at this point or that policy changes must be implemented. The surveys reveal that 
expectations are stable over time, which lowers the risk of large swings in money demand. The 
persistence in concerns will mean that domestic currency credit will continue to carry a higher 
price compared to euro credit. If, as some authors have forecasted, the Bulgarian economy 
increasingly uses the euro as medium of exchange with increased integration with EMU 
countries, this economic cost will become less of a problem. There is also an orderly exit from 
the currency board on the near horizon with the approaching entry into the EMU. Unilateral 
adoption of the euro ahead of such entry would eliminate the risk premium on local currency 
assets but that policy raises a host of new economic and political issues, the potential cost of 
which is difficult to measure.  
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Table 1 
Macroeconomic developments, Bulgaria 1992–2003. 
 
Year CPI 
inflation 
(percentage 
change in 
the CPI) 
Budget 
balance as 
percent of 
GDP 
(- deficit) 
Percentage 
change in 
M2 
 
Gross fixed 
capital 
formation 
as percent 
of GDP 
Real GDP 
growth 
(percentage 
change) 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
Current 
account as 
percent of  
GDP 
(- deficit) 
1992 79.2  -2.9  53.7    -7.3 15.3   
1993 63.9  -8.7  54.5    -1.5 16.4   
1994 121.9  -3.9  76.8  9.3  1.8  12.8  -0.3 
1995 32.9  -5.7  39.3  14.6  2.9  11.1  -0.2 
1996 310.8  -10.4  117.8  8.9  -9.4  12.5  0.2 
1997 578.6  -2.1  345.0  12.2  -5.6  13.7  4.1 
1998 0.9  0.9 11.5 11.6  4.0 12.2 -0.5 
1999 6.2 -0.9 11.8 15.9  2.3 16.0 -5.3 
2000 11.4  -1.0  28.8  16.3  5.4  17.9  -5.6 
2001 4.8 -0.9 26.1 19.9  4.0 19.5 -6.5 
2002 4.4 -0.8 12.2  9.3  4.0 16.8 -4.4 
2003 5.6 -0.7 18.4 18.0
a  4.1
a  12.7 -8.7 
Sources: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report, various years; Bulgarian 
National Bank, Annual Report, various years, and data from the National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria.  
a Based on the first six months of 2003. 
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Table 2 
What is the likelihood that the currency board will collapse in the next 6 months, 
12 months, or 5 years with a sharp devaluation of the local currency?  
National surveys, Bulgaria, August 2000, October 2001, June 2002, and August 2003. 
Percent of respondents by type of response. 
 
6 months horizon  12 months horizon  5 years horizon 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Very  big  12.3 5.5  4.6 3.5  12.4 4.7  6.7 3.8  13.3  7.4 9.9 8.9 
Big  19.0  9.7  10.9  9.3 24.0 14.4  11.9 12.9 25.7  22.3 16.3 18.9 
Small   29.7 28.3  28.5 31.1 28.7 31.6  29.9 31.5 30.4  29.3 27.6 25.7 
Very 
small  13.5 23.2  14.2 17.1 15.2 24.6  15.5 17.0 12.0  20.4 11.6 13.9 
None  20.6 30.7  26.7 26.6 15.3 21.7  20.5 21.8 12.9  16.8 17.7 18.2 
I don’t 
know  4.8    2.6  15.1  12.4 4.5 3.0  15.5  13.0 5.7  3.8  16.9  14.4 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0  23
Table 3 
The perceived effect of the Bulgarian currency board and unemployment. 
National surveys, Bulgaria, August 2000, October 2001, June 2002, and August 2003. 
Percent of respondents by type of response. 
 
 
Statement: The currency board contributes to high unemployment 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Strongly agree  25.0  14.3  26.2  10.7 
Agree 22.6  14.3  16.8  11.8 
Disagree 19.7  20.6 6.4  14.9 
Strongly disagree  9.2  21.6  6.9  20.8 
I don’t know  23.5  29.2  43.8  41.7 
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Table 4 
Knowledge about the operations of the Bulgarian currency board. 
Survey data, August 2000, October 2001, June 2002, and August 2003. 
Summary statistics. 
 
Statement 1 
(monetary discretion) 
Statement 2 
(government debt) 
Statement 3 
(forex reserves)   
2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Strongly 
agree  38.5  35.7  38.4  36.6 20.6  19.9  -  16.8 19.3  21.2  -  16.2 
Agree  18.2  19.0  13.3  13.0 13.5  16.5  -  13.9 17.2  24.3  -  13.3 
Disagree   8.8 6.5  8.1  3.2 10.5 8.1  -  5.2 12.2 6.4  -  3.8 
Strongly 
disagree  4.8  4.9  1.9  4.0 4.6  5.7  -  6.8 7.2  5.1  -  6.1 
I don’t 
know  29.7  33.9  38.3  43.2 50.8  49.8  -  57.3 43.9  43.0  -  60.6 
Total  100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: The numbers of the table are percent of the total by type of response. 
Statement 1: Under the currency board, the authorities cannot issue currency at their discretion. 
Statement 2: Under the currency board, the government cannot borrow funds from the central bank. 
Statement 3: Under the currency board, the leva (domestic money) in circulation have full coverage by the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank.  25
Table 5 
Perceived risk of devaluation, views on the currency board and respondent demographics. 
Dependent variable ranges from 1 (high probability of devaluation) to 5 (zero probability of 
devaluation)  
over the next 6 months or 5 years.  
 
  2000 survey  2001 survey  2002 survey  2003 survey 
  6 months  5 years  6 
months  5 years  6 
months  5 years  6 
months  5 years 
Unemployme
nt   
-0.26*** 
(0.06) 
-0.26*** 
(0.07) 
-
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
-
0.29*** 
(0.07) 
-
0.30*** 
(0.08) 
-0.20** 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
Informed  -0.006 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.28*** 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
High school 
education 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.22** 
(0.09) 
0.003 
(0.09) 
0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.19** 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
Higher 
education 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
-0.30*** 
(0.11) 
0.18* 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
-0.28** 
(0.11) 
0.20* 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
Female  -0.03 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.08 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
Age   0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002)
-0.002 
(0.002)
0.003 
(0.002)
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002)
0.001 
(0.002)
Voting for 
UDF 
0.27*** 
(0.09) 
0.36*** 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
-0.16 
(0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.12) 
LR chi2(7) 
Number of 
observation 
29.99 
      951 
39.77 
    943 
41.55 
     962 
34.06 
      949 
21.74 
     707 
43.95 
     694 
8.77 
     846 
19.85 
     828 
Notes: Ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant at the 1(5, 10) percent level.  
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Table 6 
What, in your opinion, are the most important reasons why Bulgaria  
will not have a currency board in 5 years?  
National survey, Bulgaria, August 2003. 
Percent of respondents by type of response. 
 
  First round of 
answers 
Second round of 
answers 
Third round of 
answers 
External economic factors, which 
will have a negative effect on the 
Bulgarian economy 
19.6 6.1  8.3 
Pressure from international 
institutions  17.3 17.3 8.3 
The current government intends to 
remove the currency board  8.6 13.3 6.3 
The need to raise incomes in the 
country  13.2 20.5  18.2 
Financial instability is a chronic 
problem in Bulgaria and the 
currency board cannot remedy that  
6.5 10.8  15.3 
Within five years, the Bulgarian 
economy will be strong enough and 
will not need a currency board 
7.9 10.8  12.5 
Within five years, Bulgaria will 
enter the European Union and the 
lev will be replaced by the euro   
27.0 21.2  31.3 
Number of responses                   433                    278                  144 
Notes: The question about why the currency board will not be in pace in five years was asked after the following 
question: “ In your opinion, will Bulgaria have a currency board in five years” to which respondents could answer 
“it will” (382 respondents), “it will not” (446 respondents) or “I don’t know” (152 respondents) .  
 
Survey respondents were asked to provide three answers choosing from the list of reasons above. The percentages 
in the first column show the distribution of first round of answers, the second column the distribution of the second 
round of answers., and the third column the distribution of the third round of answers.   27
Table 7  
Demographic characteristics and reasons to expect an end to the currency board n Bulgaria.  
Marginal effects form a multinomial logit model.  
National survey, Bulgaria, August 2003. 
 
 
External 
shocks 
Pressure 
form 
internationa
l 
organizatio
ns 
Intention of 
the current 
government 
The need 
to raise 
incomes 
Chronic 
financial 
instability 
Improvin
g 
economy 
EMU 
entry 
High 
school 
educatio
n 
0.09* 
(0.04) 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.04)
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.05)
Higher 
educatio
n 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.05)
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.07 
(0.06)
Age  0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001)
-0.001* 
(0.0007)
0.001 
(0.001)
-0.001** 
(0.0006) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001)
Female   -0.05 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.06* 
(0.03)
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.04)
Log 
Likeliho
od 
Number 
of obs. 
       45.33 
        424           
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant at the 1(5, 10) percent level.  
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